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Literature and the evolution of religious discourse:
A concluding essay
John C. Hawley

You know how to interpret the face of the earth
and the sky. How is it yo u do not know how to
interpret these times? (Luke 12:56)
Religion and literature do not play identical roles in society, but they both
rely heavily on imagination. This book has provided an examination of
representative writings from both fields to demonstrate this fact, and to
suggest points at which the differences between the two disciplines become
less important. Viewed together, these examples. raise interesting questions
regarding the viability of discussing enduring truths outside the realms of
imagination. This paradox, in turn, points to the limitations of rationality ·
in the pursuit of such truths, and the inevitability of subjectivity in the
quest for the objectively true.
These are important philosophical questions, but some readers will be
more interested in the historical and sociological aspects of the topic.
Some may characterize the trajectory trac~d by these chapters as an
example of Arnold Toynbee's model for the collapse of a civilization the civilization in question here being western Ch ristianity. The first six
studies focus on the words of Scripture, especially as they were reflected
upon in sermons to imagine the end of time, and to call the congregation
to personal conversion: as it happens, all six chapters demonstrate the
sense of crisis culminating in the Reformation. A return to the Word was
seen to be the best and effective Response to the clarion Challenge heard
throughout Europe (I here use Toynbee's vocabulary for the dialectical
movement typical within civilizations). Subsequent chapters in this volume, however, use a similar vocabulary but take an increasingly secular
tone. The movement in many is inward, a psychological self-analysis that
yearns for conversion, as in the earlier chapters - but the desired movement of soul is not forthcoming. By the time we reach the volume's closing
chapters, the individualistic response has broadened: institutionalized re-
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ligion has become not only irrelevant, but a hindrance to self-understanding and any hope for epiphany. In the place of religion, the scriptural
Word conti nues to speak - but no longer with the commanding eloquence
of unique revelation. W hat had formerly been accepted as sacred has
become, for many contemporary writers, an unusually rich story from
which one's own imagination can extrapolate - one tool, among others,
for the modern prophet's idiosyncratic search. Validation of truth has
moved away from the community.
In Toynbee's scheme civilizations go into decline when they fa il to meet
increasingly complex challenges, challenges that gradually become more
spiritual in nature. Briefly put, they collapse not because of external
problems, but because o f inherent defects in their members and a lack of
creative leadership (Nash 1969: 177). Is chis, in fact, what the Reformation
and Counterreformation presaged, the petrified life-in-death described by
Toynbee as a way-station between breakdown and dissolution? Many
would say so; several of the contributors to this volume may be among
them. Others, pointing to the promise Jesus made to bring not peace but
the sword, may use the same d ata to draw ocher conclusions. Incompatible
heuristics are the engine driving world religions; they exemplify the history
of contention to which this volume's subtitle and Preface refer. Does this
possible pattern suggest that religion is being replaced in society by an
increasing pietism, or even gnosticism, among its members?
In its Pasto ral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World
(Gaudium et Spes) participants in the Second Vatican Council humbly
approached the hermeneutics involved in the search for meaning in history:
"That the earthly and the heavenly city penetrate each other is a face
accessible to faith alone. It remains a mystery of human history, which
sin w ill keep in great disarray until the splendor of God's sons is fully
revealed" (Abbott 1967: 239). It will come as no surprise that Karl Rahner,
an architect of the Council, took the same faith-stance:
... man's ·historicity stands in need of hea ling which is not to be
looked for from the internal dynamism of history. So that it becomes
clear that revelation alone brings man's historicity to itself by
showing the genuine end of history to be the final consummation
of history and the world in salvation ... as a theological term man's
historicity means that man rema ins open to God's disposal in such
a way char he may expect the salvation of himself, of his world and
history from an historical and personal event. (Rahner 1983:
209 - 210)
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In less metaphysical language, Ernst Troeltsch notes that "the connection
of religious belief with particular historical events is only mediate and
relative" (Troeltsch 1991: 19); Jaroslav Pelikan holds much the same view:
" ... defining the nature of the truth of revelation and identifying the locus
of dogmatic authority are not problems that yield their resolutions to the
research of the historian" (Pelikan 1971: 156). This is a relatively new
understanding of the inherent limitations of religious assertion, 1 a recognition that the proper realm for such language is not the sa me as that
of history or, at least, that its methodology cannot attain the same kind
of certai nty that the scientific methodology employed by history may wish
to claim. As we have noted, literature has never made the sort of truth
claims that the scientist does, and argues instead for different types of
truth.
Of course, the claims of the historian must be carefully tempered, as
an increasing cohort of participants and observers have pointed out.
Dennis Nineham, for example, notes that
what any historian is concerned with is past events, but the modern
historian emphasizes that once an event is past we can have no
direct access to it or relationship with it. All we can have are data
relating to it (Nineham 1977: 78) .. . the 'facts' as established by the
historian can no more be identified with the original 'event' than
the data can. An event is something which can never be compassed
in its fullness even by those present when it occurs; and certainly
no structure of words, whether those of the historian or his sources,
can ever encompass an event. (Nineham 1977: 81)
But this narrowing of the rules of evidence has resulted in confusion: an
ever-more-regressive deconstruction of the truths we hold most dear.
N ietzsche was one of the first blatantly to rejoice in this fact:
What, then , is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomo rphisms - in short, a sum of human relations, which
have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and
rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and
obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has
forgotten that this is what they are: metaphors which are worn o ut
and without sensuous power.(Palsey 1978: 70)
Nietzsche seems instinctively to use literary language to explain himself,
and the analogy is a natural one. T.R. Wright notes that " modern literary
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theory ... has emphasized the illusory nature of realism whi le recent
historiography has stressed the fictiveness of history" (Wright 1988: 84).
The philosophical assault to which Wright refers is applied specifically to
history by Michel Foucault with the Schadenfreude we have come to
associate with postmodernism: "We want historians to confirm our belief
that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities.
But the true historical sense confirms our existence among countless lost
events, without a landmark or a point of reference" (Foucault 1977: 156
- 157, cited in Wright 1988: 84) . The balloon is well-inflated, the wind
is up, but the compass cannot find magnetic north. Where does this "drift"
lead us today?
An increased historical consciousness increases this disorientation. As
Dennis Nineham remarks, " ... one century's understa ndi ng of an historical
event never commends itself in its entirety to the historians of the next
century ... " (Nincham 1977: 84). As the chapters of this book demonstrate,
revisionist readings become especially pronounced in the study of the
written and spoken word. The literary "canon" is put in question; the
politics of publication interrogate the clarity of literary evaluation. "No
classic text," in the view of David Tracy,
comes to us without the plural and ambiguous history of effects of
its own production and all its former receptions ... Historical ambiguity means that a once seemingly clear historical narrative of
progressive Western enlightenment and emancipation has now become a montage of classics and newspeak, of startling beauty and
revolting cruelty, of partial emancipation and ever subtler forms of
entra pment. (Tracy 1987: 69- 70)
But the limitations of human understanding have been a donnee since
Adam and Eve. Those who argue from a confessional framework situate
this newly-humbled overview of history, with its "hermeneutics of suspicion" (Ricoeur 1970: 32-36), withi n a posited teleology, a "salvation"
history (Heilsgeschichte). Seeking to trace a line of significance threading
its way through the accumulating details of time, writers like John Henry
Newman, in his "An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine"
(1845), describe parameters to discern both change and continuity in
theological assertions over time. As Jaroslav Pelikan notes (1969: 12-37),
any meaningful objectivity in Newman's proposed line of inquiry is fraught
with difficulties. His criteria of "authenticity" in the historical development of doctrine are the following: 1) the preservation of type or idea
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(but this was objected to by Luther, Sebastian Franck, John Headley,
Franklin Littell, G.J. H eering, and others); 2) continuity of principles
(contested by Francois Guizot, Schleiermacher, and others}; 3) assimilative
power (refuted by Harnack, Karl Holl, and others); 4) early anticipation
(disputed by Martin Chemnitz and others); 5) logical sequence (objected
to by Luther); 6) preservative additions (refuted by Franz Pieper); 7)
chronic continuance (contested by Harnack a nd Gerhard Ebeling). Pelikan
can affirm that "the fact of development of doctrine ... is beyond dispute"
(Pelikan 1969: 41), but he remains convinced that parameters for discovering a goal in such development, let alone discerning God's purposes in
history, rely upon a confessional foundation. 2
If the very facts upon which history is built are increasingly in question,
the truth of traditional faith claims inevitably remains a bone of contention
for many; the assertio n that "faith informs understanding" does not satisfy
some investigators. For someone like Troeltsch the distinction between
the confessional and the scientific has too frequently been blurred. In his
view,
the theological investigations of recent centuries are replete with
this special methodology geared to the history of salvation, which
vitiates and distorts the methodology of secular history in various
ways, a nd with distinctive Ch ristian theories of know ledge supposedly based either on the principle of ecclesiastical obedience or on
regeneration and inner experience. (T roeltsch 1991: 23) 3
In any case, the chapters of this book demonstrate the fact, and imply
the process, of the development of the religious imagination, which some
would describe as a development of doctrine. Harnack dismissed doctrinal
continuity as bullheaded tenacity; in refuting this view, Pelikan suggests
that Harnack missed the point. Pelikan notes that the change is organic
(and fairly inevitable), not mechanical or planned: " it does not do so on
the basis of the a priori logic prescribed by the theologian, but on the
basis of an a posteriori logic to be described by the historia n" (Pelikan
1969: 51). The res ult is not tidy. Doctrinal "continuity" cuts across
institutional professions, in spite of intransigent statements to the contrary,
and the religious imagination, however timeless its inspiration, cannot
help but reflect its age - and its age's limitations. On the one hand,
underlying the controversies of the sixteenth century were convictions
upon which both sides agreed (the Virgin Birth, for example); but those
agreements ma y now have been extrapolated beyond possible agreement
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(the declaration of the Immaculate Conception in 1854 and of the Assumption in 1950, for example, have pushed the two "sides" apart) . On
the other hand, Protestant Bible criticism has divided its own community
but pushed Catholicism closer to it. The supposed continuity of doctrine
often demands rather elaborate defence. Twentieth century Christians
might ask themselves whether they identify more readily with the doctrines
reflected in this book's early chapters, or with those in the latter half:
believers imagine God differently now.
If recent writers can be believed, many of the views of Troeltsch have
now become acceptable across a wide doctrinal spectrum. One Jesuit, for
example, concludes tha t one of the second Vatican Council's principal
achievements was a "recognition" of history, with certain consequences
in the Christian imagination:
Firstly, the recognition of history and the location of faith within
it, rather than alongside it or in opposition to it, meant a renewal
of true historical memory rather than mere adaptation. Secondly, a
respect for history makes it impossible to reduce diversity and
plurality to certain universal formulae. Finally, no separation is
possible between religious history and the history of the world at
large. We can no longer use the categories which help to distinguish
between the sacred and the profane. (Sheldrake 1991: 29)
But removing the border between the sacred and the profane has
disturbing consequences, to say the least. For some, like Wolhan Pannenberg, the apparent disenfranchisement is overcome by what would seem
to be a sacralizing of the profane. Revelation, for him, "should not be
limited to a special series of events cut off from the rest of history but
include all history, which is not so much Hegel's 'self-revelation of the
absolute' as a narrative interpretation of the significance of world-events"
(Wright 1988: 90). The assumption would seem to be that objective Truth
cannot be tied down to any comprehensive view of history, let alone to
any especially pregnant moments in time, but meaning can nonetheless
be, for lack of a better word, "realized" in the telling of a narrative that
pieces parts of time together. For Ricoeur, Arthur Danto, Hayden White
and others, meaning is conveyed only in the telling of, in the context of,
a "story."
If Pannenberg would allow us to extend his definition of revelation to
the stories that have come under discussion in this volume, we would
have to assert that they have been historicized attempts to recogn ize
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meaning, not to invent it. As Stephen Crites writes, "people do not sit
down on a cool afternoon and think themselves up a sacred story. They
awaken to a sacred story, and their most significant mundane stories a re
told in the effort, never fully successful, to articulate it" (Crites 1971:
295 - 296) . But if meaning is only demonstrated in the actual telling of
stories, many of our contemporaries would protest that such subjective
testimonials are hardly acceptable as unbiased evidence of Ultimate meaning. In putting the case in these terms, we have moved beyond the strict
categories of "the historical method" endorsed by Troeltsch and moved
into the realm of hermeneutics and narratology. 4 Yet Troeltsch certainly
imagined time as "storical," to coin a term: " ... unique forces also stand
in a current and context comprehending the totality of events, where we
see everything conditioned by everything else so that there is no point
within history which is beyond this correlative involvement and mutual
influence" (Troeltsch 1991: 14). No one historian can step beyond the web
in which she or he lives, nor can anyone know everything related even to
one given moment. His historical method inevitably selects the correlations
and mutual influences it chooses to foreground as meaningful "glue."
But Troeltsch makes no bones about his own faith commitment and
how that shapes his own story:
I would say that it is the essence of my view that it thoroughly
combats historical relativism, which is the consequence of the historical method only within an atheistic or a religiously skeptical
framework. Moreover, my view seeks to overcome this relativism
thro ugh the conception of history as a disclosure of the divine
reason. (Troeltsch 1991: 270)
"Divine reason"? What kind of historical method would allow such a
concept, except one that recognized the importance of personal commitment and assertion even in a transient world? Sounding much like Toynbee, Troeltsch asserts that
the point is that history is not a chaos but issues from unitary forces
and aspires towards a unitary goal. For the believer in religion and
ethics, history is an orderly sequence in which the essential truth
and profundity of the human spirit rise from its transcendent ground
- not without struggle and error, but with the necessary consistency
of a development that has had a normal beginning. (Troeltsch 1991:
27)
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Thus, even though the historical method "relativizes everything," it does
so "not in the sense that it eliminates every standard of judgement and
necessarily ends in a nihilistic skepticism, but rather in the sense that
every historical structure and moment can be understood only in relation
to others and ultimately to the total context." Furthermore, it asserts that
"standards of values cannot be derived from isolated events but only from
a n overview of the historical totality." Most importantly, "it is impossible
to arrive at some suprahistorical core" (Troeltsch 1991: 18).
Yet the assertion that history can only " ultimately" be understood in
relation to the "total" context implies that it cannot ever be fully understood - except, perhaps, in the next life, the "supra-historical" to w hich
we have no inviting access. How, then, can the fear of relativism be faced
in such a profane (but baptized) world ? One way, the one that has shaped
so much theological history, is by accepting the notion of unique revelatio n, as defined by one's recognized authori ty, and then arguing over its
meaning. Another way, not necessarily exclusive of the first, is by learning
to swim with confidence.
An elaboration upon the second alternative requires a return to Arnold
Toynbee. Despite the sorry history he presents of so many Ozymandias's
lying desolate in the shifting sands, his organized view of time leaves
roo m for an overall optimism. Critics like Pitirim Sorokin, however,
astutely note that supposedly inclusive "systematic" views like Toynbee's
are inherentl y partial, inevitably biased, and finally dishonest to the human
condition:
Not only is the total civilization of such enormous 'culture-areas'
as the Greco-Roman, or the Sinic, or of any other of his civilizations
not one whole or system, but the total civilization of even a smallest
possible civilizational area - that of a single individual - is but a
coexistence of several and different systems and congeries unrelated
with one anoth er in any way except spatial adjacency in a biological
organism. (Sorokin 1940: 189 -190)
" Having mistakenly taken different congeries for system ... ", Sorokin
writes, Toynbee comes up with "not so much a theory of civilizational
change as much as an evaluative theory of civilizational progress or
regress" (So rokin 1940: 191).
Thus, despite the massive scholarship and intimidating length of Toynbee's study, Sorokin and others point out the shaping prejudices that no
historian, no human being, can escape: our imaginations provide the
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wonderfully creative and individually tailored selection that we each take
fro m reality. The alternative to the fa lse confidence of a constructed view
of Truth, therefore, is not the abandonment of systems, but a recognition
of their inadequacy. Historical consciousness is not only a source for
malaise, a misfiring of overloaded circuits. In the specific case that Sorokin
discusses, for example, "quite a la rge number of Egyptiac or Babylonic
or especia lly Hellenic cultural systems traits ... are very much alive as
components of the contemporary Western or other cultures. And they a re
alive not as objects in a museum but as living realities in our and other
cultures" (Sorokin 1940: 193) - in much the same way that Pilgrim's
Progress and the story of Adam and Eve, threading their way through
several of our chapters, speak anew (but differently) in each age. T he
civilization in which they originated has collapsed, but the "artifacts"
have not.
The success one age may or may not have in retrieving the significance
of that artifact will vary, as Christianity's experience with the Bible has
repeatedly shown. But, as Hans-Georg Gadamer points out, "every encoun ter with tradition that takes place within historical consciousness
involves the experience of the tension between the text ar:i.d the present.
The hermeneutic task consists in not covering up this tension by attempting a naive assimilation but consciously bringing it out" (Gadamer 1975:
273). In his analysis of this experience Gadamer is, in general, more
optimistic than many. He writes, for example, that "in the process of
understanding there takes place a real fusing of horizons, which means
that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously removed"
(Gadamer 1975: 273).
But just how often does th is "process of understanding" take place?
Since he imagines the " fusing of horizons" as a form of translation, it is
not surprsing that Gadamer believes that
the existence of literature in translation shows that something is
presented in such works that is true and valid for all time. Thus it
is by no means the case that world literature is an alienated fo rm
of that which constitutes the mode of being of a work according to
its original purpose. It is rather the historical mode of being of
literature that makes it possible for somethi ng to belong to world
literature. (Gadamer 1975: 144)
Gad amer embraces the humanistic idea o f a common human condition,
one that can be shared if we only find the best tools for transla tion. On
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this point, recent critics are skeptical, pointing to the experience of
colonization as a demonstration that politics inevitably subvert the desired
"fusion" (see N iranjana 1992, for example). In terms of a specifically
religious imagination, this act of "translating" eternal truths from one
culture (or time) to another has historically shared a great deal with the
clumsiness, naivete, and cruelty of colonizers.
T hus, "artifacts" is not a suitable term for the truths that can be shared
across cultural or temporal borders. Happily, the tempered optimism of
David Tracy seems mo re cognizant of the biological home in which our
imaginations live, and in which they are shaped by emotions beyond our
understanding or control. This is the condition touched upon by Sorokin
and analyzed at length by Freud. "We begin to suspect," writes Tracy,
that consciousness itself is radically intertextual. Perhaps it only
seems this way because we will not face the dispossession of the
ego by all the plural and ambiguous texts that have usurped its w ill
to domination disguised as the self's will to truth. Reason can be
so driven by a debilitating optimism that it will not dwell for long
upon either the radical interruptions of history or the unconscious
distortions of self and culture. It is not merely that reason will not
sometimes stay for an answer, but that it will not even wait for a
question. (Tracy 1987: 78)
"Debilitating optimism" is a refreshingly iconoclastic description of the
huma n tendency to shut down discussion when it frightens us. But is the
alternative an "energizing pessimism"? Perhaps this would be another way
to describe the skep ticism which many today, leery of the forced march
of institutionalized "truths" through our bloody history, have embraced
with anger, resignation, or hope. What we have at work here is something
far more profound, far less adolescent, than Swinburne's outrageous
blasphemy in "H ymn to Proserpine": "Thou· hast conquered, 0 pale
Galilean; the world has grown grey from thy breath." In the view of
many, the world "will not even wait for [the] question" posed by the
Galilean before marching off to foreclose in his name. Faced with this
self-serving orthodoxy, many others happily allow the religious imagination to speak in unorthodox ways.
If, as our writers here contend, theologizing is an act of imagination,
and if, like any act of imagination, it is situated in, and thereby shaped
by, its historical and social context, it follows that this social act has
responsibilities both to the historical record and to the present. It is easy
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enough to condemn sects that retreat to a mountaintop to await the
world's. end; it is less simple to approach, with honesty, the shared
limitations that plague our own theologies. It is with this recognition that
Ernest Gellner, while ridicu ling the gnosticism of postmodernist jargon,
endorses what he identifies as Enlightenment Rationalist Fundamentalism,
which absolutizes no substantive convictions, but does absolutize some
fo rmal principles of knowledge, proced ure, and moral valuation.
Sounding more than a little like Voltaire, Gellner sets down as his
manifesto the observation that "the world does not arrive as a packagedeal - which is the customary manner in which it appears in traditional
cultures - but piecemeal. Strictly speaking, though it arrives as a packagedeal, it is dismembered by thought" (Gellner 1992: 80). Dismemberment
is hardly an attractive term for the process, but it does take on a greater
charm if one imagines pointing it in the d irection of some belief-system
other than one's own; this, at least, has historically been a human tendency.
But one can quickly see how apposite is Gellner's description of the
process. Leaving very little to the reader's imagination, he proposes the
following as the consequences of his approach:
... it desacralizes, disestablishes, disenchants everything· substantive:
no privileged facts, occasions, individuals, institutions or associa-

tions. In other words, no miracles, no divine interventions and
conjuring performances and press conferences, no saviours, no sacred churches or sacramental communities. All hypotheses are subject to scrutiny, all facts open to novel interpretations, and all facts
subject to symmetrical laws which preclude the miraculous, the
sacred occasion, the intrusion of the Other into the Mundane.
(Gellner 1992: 81)
Put this way, "Enlightenment Rationalist Fundamentalism" sounds a bit
like a postmodern reversal of Coleridge - in effect, a perpetual suspension
of belief - and one wonders whether or not any individual could have
the purity of intention that seems to be required of this approach's
devotees. Who wants to live in a desert, clean as it may be? Nonetheless,
Gellner also offers a more nuanced characterization:
It shares with monotheistic exclusive scriptural religion the belief in
the existence of a unique truth, instead of an endless plurality of
meaning-systems; but it repudiates the idea that this unique vision
is related to a privileged Source, and could even be defi nitive. It
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shares with hermeneutic relativism the repudiation of the claim that
a substantive, final and definitive version of the truth is available.
It is, however, separated from it by refusing to endorse, as equally
valid, each pre-Enlightenment, socially enmeshed, cognitive cocoon
of meanings.(Gellner 1992: 84)
Thus, it is "absolutist and nonrelativistic in procedure, and permanently
attentiste rather than relativist in its substantive, first-order conviction"
(Gellner 1992: 80). Gellner seems to be positing the existence of objective
truths - asserting a faith that provides a hopeful foundation for our life's
search, even if we never encounter those truths in an ultimately convincing
way. If this sounds like a reactionary enthronement of Reason, it should;
when push comes to shove, in fact, Gellner hedges and suggests that the
reader should not let this all become too abstract. "Societies," after all,
"are systems of real constraints, operating in a unique nature, and must
be understood as such, and not simply as systems of meaning" (Gellner
1992: 95) - we do have to get on with life and act as if it all held together,
at least for the moment, and at least for oneself. But we must always
remain willing to "dismember" our perceptions when presented with new
views. As unsatisfying as this blatant return to an Enlightenment prepostmodern world may be, it does have the appeal of clearing the decks
and taki ng a fresh look at all preconceptions and constricted creeds, the
debris of our dialectical history. It may also remind us of Karl Rahner's
recommendation, mentioned early in this concluding chapter, that the
believer "remain open to God's disposal" (Rahner 1983: 210) - which
may, here, be a rather disturbing pun.
More balanced, however, is David Tracy's suggestion that "to interpret
well must now mean that we attend to and use the hermeneutics of both
retrieval and suspicion" (Tracy 1987: 77). Retrieval does not demand the
maintenance of oppressive institutional and interpretive structures. It does
suggest, in fact, that Gadamer's notion of "fusion" is not without merit,
especially if carried out with the suspicion so clearly defined by Gellner.
As we have seen with Pitirim Sorokin, "civilizations" do not collapse and
diappear as absolutely as Toynbee implied. But the ongoing evolution of
a postmodern Christianity will necessarily be a patchwork affair rather
than a monolithic structure or a monologic conversation. The chapters in
this volume suggest that this has been the pattern for the development of
Christianity: the religious imagination always implies a conversation.
If, as David Tracy recognizes, "the split self of postmodernity is caught
between conscious activity and a growing realization of the radical oth-
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erness not on ly around but within us" (Tracy 1987: 77), this does not
mean that the alternative to "standing up for what we believe in" is a
gutless surrender to someone else's imagination. Instead, "our theories
and our conversations can become... what they in fact always were:
limited, fragile, necessary exercises in reaching relatively adequate knowledge of language and history alike" (Tracy 1987: 81). And this "relatively
adequate knowledge" suggests Diana Eck's helpful distinctio n between
relativism and pluralism. "For the nihilistic relativist," she writes, "the
impossibility of uni versalizing any one truth claim suggests the emptiness
of all truth claims" (Eck 1993: 194),- but
the pluralist, on the other hand, stands in a particular community,
even as restless critic. I would argue that there is no such thing as
a generic pluralist. There are Christian pluralists, Hindu pluralists,
and even avowedly humanistic pluralists - all daring to be themselves, not in isolation from but in relation to one another. Pluralists
recognize that others also have communities and commitments. They
are unafraid to encounter one another and realize that they must
all live with each other's particularities. The challenge for the
pluralist is commitment without dogmatism and community without
communalism. The theological task, and the task. qf a pluralist
society, is to create the space and the means for the encounter of
commitments, not to neutralize all commitment. (Eck 1993: 195)
It is in storytelling and in explaining ourselves to one another that this
encounter of commitments continues co become possible, pointing toward
that which remains transcendent.

Notes
1. Pelikan notes chat " ... history was assigned a lesser real ity than the superhistorica l rea lm, from which the truth of revelation was thought to have come.
If the life and the structures of the Church were involved in the historical
process, as no one cou ld deny that they were, one needed nevertheless to insist
that the Church as such belonged to the transcendent order of real ity, despite
its participation in the immanent order. So also, the doctrines of the Church
had to be grou nded in the 'really rea l' beyond history, even though they were
regrettably historical, all too historical, in their genesis and development"
(Pelikan 1971: 157).
2. For more on chis topic, see, among others, Pelikan 1969: 12 - 24 and Crowley
1992.

238

john C. Hawley

3. Yet he also ca lls Christianity "the supreme religious force of history" (Troeltsch
1991: 26) and endorses an "inner" experience: in the person of Jesus "a God
distinct from nature produced a personality superior to nature with eternally
transcendent goa ls and the willpower to change the world. H erc a religious
power manifests itself, which to anyone sensitive enough to catch its echo in
one's own soul, seems to be the conclusion of all previous religious movements
and the starting poin t of a new phase in the history of religion, in which
nothing has yet emerged . Indeed, even for us today it is unth inkable that
something higher sho uld emerge, no matter how many new forms and combinations this purely inward and perso na l belief in God may yet enter"
(Troeltsch 1991: 28).
4. "It is important to recognize that the stories told by historians have a basic
epistemological difference from literary fictions. There is a specific external
reference, an 'objectivity' which can be investigated, checked, cha llenged and
modified. Historical accounts interlock like maps; t he discoveries of separate
investigators can be combined. There is a fundamental simila rity in narrative
mode but a fundamental difference in the object of 'reference' between the
stories we call 'history' and those we call 'fiction"' (Wright 1988: 91). Gadamer,
also, notes that "The difference between a litera ry work of art and any other
literary text is not so fundamental ... thc essential d ifference of these va rious
' languages' ... lies .. . in the d istinction between the claims to truth t hat each
makes. All literary works have a profound community in that the linguistic
form makes effective the significance of the contents to be expressed. In t his
light, the und erstanding of texts by, say, a histor ian is not so very different
from the experience of art. And it is not mere chance that the concept of
literature embraces not on ly works of literary art, but everything that has
been transmitted in writing" (Gadamer 1975: 145) . Veeser, also, suggests that
"every expressive act is embedded in a network of material practices," so that
" literary and non-literary ' texts' circulate inseparably." But he goes further,
and writes that " no discourse, imaginative or archival, gives access to unchanging truths or expresses una lterable human nature" (Veeser 1989: Preface) .
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